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NOTES.

A Reply to a Criticism.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW :

There are some errors in Professor Thilly's review, in the May number of this journal, of my *Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance*, which create false impressions regarding its contents and regarding Schopenhauer. "What," says Professor Thilly (p. 307), "can it mean to say, as Professor Caldwell says, that 'the intellect, in making man conscious of an ideal world, becomes an active thing'?" The quotation from my book is inaccurate and incomplete. The original is: "*If, however, we take a broad grasp of Schopenhauer's philosophy of art and religion, we are enabled to see how the intellect, in making man conscious of an ideal world, becomes an active thing in his life, and no longer a merely passive thing.*" The italics are not in the original, but I employ them here to show how Professor Thilly's partial citation clause is conditioned in the original sentence. In what logicians call a conditional sentence, it is necessary to know the antecedent as well as the consequent. Professor Thilly's 'that' instead of my 'how' makes me guilty of a piece of dogmatism, and his mutilation of my sentence makes me guilty of a most irritatingly bad collocation of words. I speak of the conditions under which we may apprehend a certain truth, and he speaks of the said truth as if it were an isolated piece of assertion of my own. The words, as he quotes them, do not get their proper strength, because the three preceding sentences of the paragraph have been talking about a contradiction that Schopenhauer seems to find in the human intellect. He sometimes makes the intellect passive (to this view I devote *three chapters* elsewhere in the book), and sometimes (as the *tool* of the will) active. And in the sentence from which Professor Thilly quotes I am trying to suggest how we may see the latter view to be the correct one. The citation in the review presupposes, however, not merely the rest of the sentence and the rest of the paragraph (the following sentence partly illustrates), but the three chapters in question and the greater part of the book,—one illustration of the impossibility of separating, as Professor Thilly does, clauses and sentences and paragraphs from their context and setting. One of my main efforts is to try to show how Schopenhauer's own principles compel us to take an active instead of a merely passive view of the intellect. I do not think that I shoot pieces of dogmatism out of a pistol, without giving the reader fair warning.

Professor Thilly also asks his readers what it "can mean to say, as Professor Caldwell does, that our artistic and religious and social consciousness,

so far from merely furnishing us with unattainable ideals (Ideas), may all become dynamic elements in our lives." No journal can allow such inaccuracy of representation to pass unchallenged. First, the original and un mutilated sentence occurs on page 479, and not page 497. Secondly, it contains a plural and not a singular subject, so that the 'all' and the plural are justified. And the word 'Ideas' in a bracket is explained in my preface. As a shortened form for 'Platonic Ideas,' any reader of Schopenhauer or of my book would be perfectly familiar with it. "Our artistic and our religious and our social consciousness, so far from merely furnishing us with unattainable ideals (Ideas), may all become dynamic elements in our lives, forces that idealize and elevate our lives," — so reads the original. Even the words in the sentence that follows the quoted words, throw some small light upon them. As to the possible meaning of the sentence — well ! there are two chapters in the book on art, one on ethics (in which Schopenhauer's social philosophy also is discussed), and one on religion. An utterance in my second last chapter, as the preface declares, presupposes an intimacy on the part of the reader with earlier portions of the book. The point of the sentence is to be found in the fact that Schopenhauer's views on art and ethics and religion are all "too transcendental." I try to show how, according to *his* main principles (not my "system"), art and religion and ethical conduct may become real levers, as it were, to raise humanity to successively rising planes of life.

There is an even more serious error on page 303 of the May number, in the important paragraph describing my account of Schopenhauer's attitude to idealism and realism. Professor Thilly's first quotation represents the matter of about half of my sentence and the thought of less than a third or fourth or tenth. "First he [Professor Caldwell] tells us that Schopenhauer's philosophy is undoubtedly realistic and dynamic, and at least half materialistic." This is not true. The first thing that I tell the reader, in this very paragraph and in this very chapter, is that Schopenhauer is an idealist. My preceding sentence is: "It is *at once strange and true and natural* that Schopenhauer begins in philosophy with *idealism* as a starting-point." (The word 'idealism' is italicized in the book; the other words I italicize here for emphasis.) The whole paragraph is conceived, and, I think, expressed, in the most guarded manner possible, and the whole chapter is concerned to show how *strange* it is that Schopenhauer could profess to be both an idealist and a realist. And there is not a suggestion of this in the review ! The very title of my chapter, "Schopenhauer *and* Idealism," suggests the fact that there is an element of 'externality' and looseness in Schopenhauer's relations to idealism. If Professor Thilly had drawn the attention of the reader to the summary of Chapter II in the index at the beginning of the volume, it would have been apparent that I find three kinds or forms of idealism rather hopelessly and inextricably woven into the texture of Schopenhauer's philosophy. The fact that they are so interwoven gives his philosophy the character of 'illusionism' (a thing I

do make much of, as Professor Thilly rightly says); this ‘illusionism’ is the theoretical reason of what is ordinarily and cheaply called his ‘pessimism.’ I take considerable pains to show that he is an inconsistent idealist and an inconsistent realist. Professor Thilly finds my discussion “vacillating.” It has some of the vacillation that Schopenhauer himself has — I do not dare to say *all*. The man who is to present or represent Schopenhauer must not be afraid of glaring contrasts. Any philosophy of ideal-realism or real-idealism like Schopenhauer’s must have the same capacity of ‘transfiguring’ itself that reality has, according to both philosophy and poetry. “It seems, then,” says Professor Thilly, “that Schopenhauer is not an arch-illusionist, after all !” Just so ! This is exactly what I try to show. Professor Thilly, however, penned this sentence as a final *reductio ad absurdum* of my discussion of Schopenhauer’s idealism. Schopenhauer, in spite of his illusionism, has a very serious and a very real hold upon life and upon reality.

Professor Thilly devotes nearly three of his six pages to a discussion of my “own philosophy,” of my “system.” The words that I use in my preface, and that he does me the compliment of quoting, about “craving indulgence” for “perhaps identifying my exposition or criticism or philosophy” with Schopenhauer’s name or principles, do not mean, as they certainly do not say, that I am “posing” as an “independent thinker who is desirous of building a new system on Schopenhauerian foundations.” I do not desire that anything I allege as part of Schopenhauer’s significance should meantime be read or presented by itself. And I practically say so in my preface. So it matters very little what Professor Thilly finds “my philosophy” to be. He does call it “naïve and dogmatic,” and a combination of contradictory things, like Spiritualism and Voluntarism and Materialism and Parallelism. Schopenhauer’s philosophy of will presented in the kind of way Professor Thilly would have me present it (first to expound the master’s doctrines, and then to state what is valuable in them, and then to develop my own views) would seem to me to be “naïve” and “dogmatic.” The doctrine of unconscious will is so notoriously one-sided that it takes but small skill to overturn it altogether. Then it would be, at this time of day, somewhat platitudinous to treat Schopenhauer as Professor Thilly indicates, and, in my opinion, not a little presumptuous — for philosophy has not yet learned Schopenhauer deeply enough to proceed to constructive work independent of his teaching. As to this point, I agree with Professor Deussen of Kiel, Mainländer, Gizycki, and others. Every history of philosophy we possess, and scores of books and essays in different languages, set forth the positive and the negative elements in Schopenhauer’s teaching.

Schopenhauer’s philosophy itself “combines” to some extent ‘Spiritualism’ and ‘Materialism’ and ‘Voluntarism’ and ‘Parallelism.’

Lastly, as to the logical connection of my chapters, they all reflect Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the will, — a thing that unifies his teaching, and unifies, too, what I say upon it. The errors I have indicated in Professor

Thilly's review would of themselves prevent, I fear, readers of this journal from seeing that there is such a thing as logical connection in my book.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.

W. CALDWELL.

J. A. Stewart, Senior Student and Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford, has been elected to the chair of Moral Philosophy in that university rendered vacant by the death of Professor Wallace. Professor Stewart is a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, from which he also received the honorary degree of LL.D. He is the author of *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*.

A laboratory for Experimental Psychology will be opened in University College, London, in October. The committee has secured a considerable part of the apparatus collected by Professor Hugo Münsterberg, of Freiburg. Among those who have contributed to the movement are Mr. F. Galton, Professor Henry Sidgwick, Mr. A. J. Balfour, Mr. R. B. Haldane, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson.

A lectureship in Physiological and Experimental Psychology has been recommended by the Board of Studies of Cambridge University.

Dr. S. F. McLennan, of the University of Chicago, has been appointed Associate Professor of Psychology and Pedagogy at Oberlin.

C. W. Hodge, of Princeton University, has been elected to the professorship of Philosophy in Lafayette College.

Dr. C. E. Seashore, of Yale, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Psychology in the University of Iowa.

Alex. Meiklejohn (Ph.D., Cornell) has been appointed Instructor of Philosophy in Brown University.

P. G. Knowlton (Ph.D., Leipzig) will take charge of the work in Philosophy at Fargo College, N. Dakota.

In the University of California, E. B. McGilvary has been promoted to the rank of Assistant Professor of Logic and Theory of Knowledge; G. M. Stratton (Ph.D., Leipzig) has been elected Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Laboratory; C. M. Bakewell (Ph.D., Harvard) has been appointed Instructor of Philosophy.

The editors of the REVIEW beg to announce that after the close of the current year this magazine will be published by the Macmillan Co., New York.